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with its peculiar merits as a stimulus to further enquiry. I add to that now the 
observation that anyone who is to benefit from the stimulus will have to reconsider 
Slote's arguments from just the kind of standpoint that he himself abjures-at 
least in this book, the kind of standpoint provided by some large-scale moral 
theory, such as Aristotle's, or Aquinas's, or Hume's. 
Where the Passion Is: A Reading of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments, 
by H. A. Nielsen. Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1983.204 pages. 
Reviewed by STEPHEN N. DUNNING, University of Pennsylvania. 
This is an engaging and illuminating book, one which will appeal especially 
to readers who come to Kierkegaard's Fragments not so much to learn about 
Kierkegaard as to think with him about the problem of knowledge of God. 
Although Nielsen's own argument-that Fragments is a genuine interpretation 
of New Testament teaching-is not developed until the final pages, his extensive 
"remarks" on each of the chapters are informed by his conviction that Fragments 
is a philosophical restatement of the biblical idea that faith and human reason 
are ultimately antithetical. Thus he writes in the Preface of the "brilliant contrast" 
between philosophy and the New Testament (p. ix), and concludes the book 
with the claim that Fragments presents Christianity as "the detonation on earth 
of something not of this world" (p. 203). It is this claim which lends unity to 
the entire project, and which boldly challenges the assumed autonomy and self-
sufficiency of philosophical reason. 
There are two matters which I wish to discuss in this short review, which 
illustrate respectively what strike me as the outstanding strength and the single 
weakness of Where the Passion Is. The first involves the complex metaphysical 
issues raised in Fragments, whereas the second has to do with the difficult 
question of the relation between philosophical reflection and the methods of 
historical research. 
Although Nielsen explores metaphysical matters throughout the book, his 
analysis of chapter III, "The Absolute Paradox: A Metaphysical Crotchet," serves 
nicely as a demonstration of his approach. The argument that Climacus states 
in chapter III is that God is the Unknown which is "the limit to which the Reason 
repeatedly comes" (Fragments, p. 55). Nielsen carefully and insightfully unpacks 
this concept of God by showing that it is, in Wittgenstein's sense, a "grammatical" 
rather than a cognitive statement. Both traditional theists and atheists are casti-
gated for trying to grasp "the language of transcendence wrongly as a set of 
substantive knowing-claims" (p. 79). On the contrary, knowledge about God 
cannot be abstractly conceived in referential terms: its meaning is to be found 
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only in its uses, and this means investigating not that to which the language 
refers but the linguistic context itself. The linguistic context of Christian faith, 
however, remains impenetrable to human reason alone. This is the absolute 
paradox: the concept of a God so unlike us as to be literally inconceivable is 
itself inconceivable-unless that God should somehow impart such a concept to 
us. 
It would be easy to multiply examples of Nielsen's deft handling of such 
complex philosophical issues. His unusual ability to combine clarity with imag-
ination animate the entire book. There is, however, the matter of the role that 
historical concerns ought to play in such a commentary. In his last paragraph, 
Nielsen remarks that "the author of Fragments shows little concern about the 
findings of historians" (p. 204). Although that statement refers to Kierkegaard's 
criticism of aUegedly objective historical knowledge of the truth of Christianity, 
it might just as well serve as an expression of Nielsen's own attitude toward the 
problem of understanding Kierkegaard. Like many trained in the tradition of 
Anglo-American philosophical analysis, Nielsen does not seem to think it worth 
his while to set his subject in its historical context. 
There are several levels on which this indifference is manifest, not all of them 
equally grave. Rather than discuss those hegelians whose presence lurks about 
every page of Fragments (p. 201), Nielsen prefers to contrast Kierkegaard's 
thought with that of Jean-Paul Sartre, who represents for him the contemporary 
expression of an opposing view. The only other philosopher to receive more 
than passing notice is Kant. This may be due to the fact that Nielsen employs 
the Swenson/Hong translation of Fragments, which includes the detailed histor-
ical commentary and notes by Niels Thulstrup. Although Nielsen does mention 
points of disagreement with Thulstrup several times, and makes occasional vague 
references to the inadequacies of previous interpretations, the contribution he 
hopes to make to Kierkegaard scholarship is never spelled out: Thulstrup is the 
only interpreter of Fragments mentioned by name. 
Nielsen might justifiably reply that I am simply criticizing him for not doing 
what he never intended to do, and that philosophical cross-referencing and schol-
arly name-dropping are purposely excluded from the book. There is one matter, 
however, which cannot be dismissed so easily: Nielsen overlooks the fact that 
Fragments was written in Danish, and that the English translation is far from 
perfect. One example will serve to show why this is a problem. In his discussion 
of God's awareness that a theophany could overwhelm and undo a believer, 
Climacus refers twice to God's Bekymring, which is translated by Swenson and 
Hong once as "solicitude" and once as "anxiety." This revised translation was 
published in 1962, years before Hong had standardized "anxiety" (rather than 
Lowrie's "dread") for Angst, as in The Concept of Anxiety. It is unlikely that 
Hong would retain "anxiety" now for Bekymring, for the latter clearly refers to 
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God's loving concern for his creatures, his solicitude, but not the agonizing 
uncertainty and self-doubt that Kierkegaardian "anxiety" implies. Some attention 
to this might have helped Nielsen clarify the meaning of the phrase, "God's 
anxiety," and avoid the questionable claim that Climacus "picture[s] an anxious 
God-man stepping fearfully among eggshells" (p. 40). 
That said, let me repeat: this is a stimulating and well-written book which 
presents Philosophical Fragments as a serious contribution to the philosophy of 
religion. In contexts where historical questions are not paramount, or where they 
can be treated separately, it will make a most valuable contribution. 
The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion, by Louis P. 
Pojman. University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1984. pp., 
xvi, 174. $17.50. 
Reviewed by ROBERT L. PERKINS, University of South Alabama. 
Louis Pojman's The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Reli-
gion is a ground-breaking effort and as such is presented with a proper tentative-
ness. There are some controversial arguments in the book, and it will on certain 
points be hotly debated for some time. 
Pojman's thesis is that Kierkegaard is "a philosopher, a thinker who uses 
arguments, develops concepts and employs 'thought projects' to establish conclu-
sions. He is a rationalist, who makes use of reason even if it is to show reason's 
limits." With that assertion to defend Pojman, recognizing the complexities of 
Kierkegaard's style, sets forth a number of his arguments in logical form. Pojman 
does not resort to symbolization but sticks to ordinary language and Kierkegaard's 
own vocabulary when he can in setting up the arguments in propositional form. 
For this effort to show the bare bones, the order and the coherence (or lack 
thereof) we are in Pojman's debt. Pojman also emphasizes, and he is among the 
first to do so, Kierkegaard's use of, perhaps even acceptance of, Plato's notion 
of recollection. Finally, Pojman has focused the teleological nature of Kier-
kegaard's view of man and ethics. A great deal of work remains to be done on 
Kierkegaard's Platonism and teleology, but we owe Pojman thanks for the nudge. 
We also note with complete approval that the book both begins and ends with 
a reflection on Kierkegaard's theory of communication. 
But reviewers are supposed not only to praise but also start the process of 
moving the argument forward by means of criticism. 
First, one notes the ambiguous relation Pojman bears toward the history of 
philosophy. He writes " .. .in the last analysis I have wanted to know what 
Kierkegaard has to say to us today with regard to faith. Extricated from his 
